Given a set X of natural numbers, we may formalize "The formula φ is a theorem of ω-logic over the theory T using an oracle for X" by an expression [I|X] T φ, defined using a least fixed point in the language of second-order arithmetic. We will prove that the consistency and reflection principles arising from this notion of provability lead to axiomatizations of Π 
Introduction
Reflection principles in formal arithmetic are statements of the form "If φ is a theorem of T , then φ" [12] . Using notation from provability logic [4] , for a computably enumerable theory T we may use T φ to denote a natural formalization of "φ is a theorem of T ". Then, the above statement may be written succinctly as T φ → φ. If φ is a sentence, this gives us an instance of local reflection. Although such principles merely state the soundness of T , they can almost never be proven within T itself. For example, setting φ ≡ 0 = 1, we see that T φ → φ is equivalent to ∼ T 0 = 1, which asserts the consistency of T and hence is unprovable within T itself (if T satisfies the assumptions of Gödels second incompleteness theorem). More generally, by Löb's theorem we have that T ⊢ T φ → φ only if φ is already a theorem of T [13] .
We can extend reflection to formulas φ(x), obtaining uniform reflection principles, denoted RFN[T ]. These are given by the scheme ∀x T φ(x) → φ(x) , wherex denotes the numeral of x.
Uniform reflection principles are particularly appealing because they sometimes give rise to familiar theories. If we use PRA to denote primitive recursive arithmetic, Kreisel and Lévy proved in [12] that
in fact, we may replace PRA by the weaker elementary arithmetic (EA), obtained by restricting the induction shema in Peano arithmetic to ∆ 0 0 formulas and adding an axiom asserting that the exponential function is total [2] .
Recall that the ω-rule is an infinitary deduction rule that has the following form:
φ(0), Γ φ(1), Γ φ(2), Γ . . .
∀xφ(x), Γ ,
and ω-logic is the logic generated by the ω-rule together with the standard finitary rules of the Tait calculus. More generally, ω-logic over T allows for sequents derivable in T to be used as axioms.
In this article, we will study formalizations of ω-reflection in second-order arithmetic; that is, statements of the form "If φ is a theorem of ω-logic, then φ". The question readily arises as to what it means for φ to be a theorem of ω-logic. There are at least three ways to model this. Informally, they are: (i) There is a well-founded derivation tree formalizing an ω-proof of φ, in which case we will write [P]φ.
(ii) There is a well-order Λ such that φ belongs to the set of theorems of ω-logic defined by transfinite recursion on Λ, in which case we will write [R]φ.
(iii) The formula φ belongs to the least set closed under the rules and axioms of ω-logic. If this is the case, we will write [I]φ.
Although we will discuss these in greater detail later, the ideas behind Over a strong enough formal theory, one can show that all of these notions of provability are equivalent. However, from the point of view of a weak theory, they may vary in strength. For X ∈ {P, R, I} and A ⊆ N, let us write [X|A]φ if φ is provable in the sense of X from the atomic diagram of A. Then, we define a schema ω X -RFN ≡ ∀A ∀n [X|A]φ(n,Ā) → φ(n, A) ; the notationĀ indicates a second-order constant added to represent A. If Γ is a set of formulas, ω X -RFN Γ is the restriction of this scheme to φ ∈ Γ. Then, over RCA 0 we have that:
(1)
(We will review the theories Π 1 ω -BI 0 of full bar induction and ATR 0 of arithmetical transfinite recursion in §2). The first item is proven in [1] and the second in [6] . As we will see, if we use ω X -RFN Γ [T ] to denote a variant of the scheme where ω-logic is extended by theorems of T , (2) generalizes to
(which is just Π 1 n -BI 0 if n > 1). Moreover, (1) also holds for ω-model reflection, the scheme asserting that any formula true in every ω-model must be true [11] . This begs the question: is ω I -RFN also equivalent to a natural theory? In this article, we answer the question affirmatively, and prove that:
Both equivalences are proven over the theory ECA 0 of elementary comprehension, which is strictly weaker than RCA 0 or even RCA
Layout of the article
In §2 we establish some basic notation we will use, and review the subsystems of second-order arithmetic that will be of interest to us. In §3 we review formalizations of ω-logic in the literature, and in §4 we review ω-models, which give rise to another family of reflection principles, also equivalent to bar induction. In §5 we give our formalizations using inductive definitions. In §6 we discuss completeness results for ω-logic and prove (3), and §7 introduces the reflection principles based on our fixed point construction and proves partial results leading to (4) and (5) . The latter are proven in §8 using β-models.
Second-order arithmetical theories
In this section we review some basic notions of second-order arithmetic and mention some important theories that will appear throughout the article.
Conventions of syntax
It will be convenient to work within a Tait-style calculus, so we will consider a language without negation, except on primitive predicates. Thus terms and formulas will be built from the symbols 0, 1, +, ×, exp, =, =, ∈, ∈, representing the standard constants, operations and relations on the natural numbers, along with the Booleans ∧, ∨ and the quantifires ∀, ∃. The rank of a formula is the number of logical symbols (Booleans and quantifiers) that appear in it. We assume a countably infinite set of first-order variables n, m, x, y, z . . . , which will always be denoted by lower-case letters, as well as a countably infinite set of second-order variables. It will be convenient to assume that the second-order variables are enumerated by V = V i i∈N , although we may also use X, Y, Z, . . . to denote set-variables. Tuples of firstorder terms or second-order variables will be denoted with a boldface font, e.g. t, X. In general, if S = S i i∈N is a sequence we will write S <n for S i i<n . We also include countably many set-constants O = O i i∈N , which will be used as 'oracles' (see §3.2).
We define x ≤ y by ∃z (y = x + z) and x < y by x + 1 ≤ y. In the meta-language we may also use the symbol '=', although sometimes we use '≡' instead in order to distinguish it from the object-language equality. Since we have no negation in the language, we define ∼φ by using De Morgan's laws and the classical dualities for quantifiers. In particular, we define φ → ψ by ∼φ ∨ ψ. The set of all formulas will be denoted Π 1 ω . Fix some elementary Gödel numbering mapping a formula ψ ∈ Π 1 ω to a natural number ψ ; terms and sequents of formulas are also assigned Gödel numbers. Since we will be working mainly inside theories of arithmetic, we will often identify ψ with ψ . For a natural number n, define a termn recursively by0 = 0 and n + 1 = (n) + 1. We will assume that the Gödel numbering has the natural property that ψ < φ whenever ψ is a proper subformula of φ.
We use ∆ 0 0 to denote the set of all formulas, possibly with set parameters but without the occurrence of the set-constants O i , where no second-order quantifiers appear and all first-order quantifiers are bounded, that is, of the form ∀x < t φ or ∃x < t φ. Observe that in our presentation, a ∆ Finally, if Γ is a set of formulas and n is a natural number, we use Π 1 n /Γ to denote the set of formulas of the form ∀X n ∃X n−1 , . . . , Q 1 X 1 φ, with φ ∈ Γ and Q 1 ∈ {∀, ∃}.
We will also use pseudo-terms to simplify notation, where an expression ϕ(t(x)) should be understood as a shorthand for ∃y ψ(x, y)∧ϕ(y) , with ψ a ∆ 0 0 formula defining the graph of the intended interpretation of t. Similarly, an elementary pseudo-term is an expression ∃y < s(x) ψ(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y) , where s is a standard term bounding the values of t(x). The domain of the functions defined by these pseudo-terms may be a proper subset of N.
Let us list some of the (pseudo-)terms we will use:
1. An elementary term x, y which returns a code of the ordered pair formed by x and y and elementary projection terms so that ( x, y ) 0 = x and ( x, y ) 1 = y. We will overload this notation by also using it for sequences, coded in a standard way. As with tuples of variables, we use a boldface font when a first-order object is meant to be regarded as a sequence. For a sequence s, we will also use (s) i to denote an elementary pseudo-term which picks out the i th element of s if it exists, and is undefined otherwise, and |s| denotes an elementary pseudo-term for the length of s. If n ∈ N, s ⌢ n denotes the sequence obtained by adjoining n to s as its last element.
2. An elementary term x mapping a natural number to the code of its numeral.
3. A (non-elementary) term x which, when x codes a closed term t, returns the value of t as a natural number.
4. For every formula φ and variables x 0 , . . . , x m , an elementary term φ(ẋ 0 , . . . ,ẋ m ) which, given natural numbers n 0 , . . . , n m , returns the code of the outcome of φ[x/n], i.e., the code of φ(n 0 , . . . ,n m ). We will often write such a term as φ(ẋ).
Note that we may also use this notation in the meta-language. As is standard, we may define X ⊆ Y by ∀x(x ∈ X → x ∈ Y ), and X = Y by X ⊆ Y ∧ Y ⊆ X. If the set F is meant to represent a function, we may write y = F (x) instead of x, y ∈ F . Sequents will be first-order objects of the form γ = γ 1 , . . . , γ n , where each γ i is a formula. We will treat sequents as sets, defining φ ∈ γ by ∃i < |γ| φ = (γ) i , and define γ ⊆ δ similarly. The difference between the first-and second-order use of these symbols will be clarified by the use of uppercase or lowercase letters. We may write γ, φ or (γ, φ) instead of γ ⌢ φ. We similarly use γ, δ to denote the concatenation of γ and δ. The empty sequent will be denoted by ⊥; observe that we do not take it to be a symbol of our formal language.
Basic rules and axioms
We will work with a one-sided Tait-style calculus, which proves sequents of the form γ = γ i i<n , as defined in e.g. [15] . In such a calculus, negation may only be applied to atomic formulas. We assume that the Tait calculus is formalized in such a way that the scheme stating that γ, α is derivable whenever α is a true atomic sentence is provable in ECA 0 ; this is not a strong assumption, as Σ 0 1 -completeness is provable in EA for standard calculi [10] .
We will also assume that at least the following rules are available:
where α is atomic, v, V do not appear free in γ, and α ′ is obtained from α by replacing some instances of r by r ′ . We denote this calculus by Tait; Tait ρ is the restriction of Tait which allows cuts only for formulas of rank less than ρ ≤ ω (in particular, Tait = Tait ω ).
Successor induction and comprehension
As our 'background theory' we will use Robinson's arithmetic Q [10] (essentially, PA without induction), enriched with axioms for the exponential; call the resulting theory Q + . Aside from the basic axioms of Q + , the following schemes will be useful in axiomatizing many theories of interest to us. Below, Γ denotes a set of formulas.
where φ ∈ Γ and X is not free in φ;
, and X is not free in σ or π;
where φ ∈ Γ;
With this, we may define the following theories:
Recall that we have included the exponential as a function symbol in our language; without it, RCA * 0 would require an additional axiom Exp stating that the exponential is total. In the case of ECA 0 , an alternative presentation without an exponential symbol would be less natural. Later we will make use of the fact that (in particular) ACA 0 is finitely axiomatizable [17, Lemma VIII.1.5].
Next, it will be useful to give a somewhat more economical (but equivalent) representation of Π 
Proof sketch. In [17, Lemma V.1.4], it is proven that any Π 
, where φ ′ is obtained by modifying φ in the obvious way.
Transfinite recursion and bar induction
We mention two further theories that will appear later and require a more elaborate setup. We may represent well-orders in second-order arithmetic as pairs of sets Λ = |Λ|, < Λ , and define
where LO(Λ) is a formula expressing that Λ is a linear order.
Given a set X whose elements we will regard as ordered pairs λ, n , let X λ be the set of all n with λ, n ∈ X, and X < Λ λ be the set of all η, n with η < Λ λ. With this, we define the transfinite recursion scheme by
Finally, we define
These theories are rather powerful, yet as we will see, Π 
To be precise, Π 
Formalized ω-logic
In this section we will give the necessary definitions in order to reason about ω-logic within second-order arithmetic, and introduce the provability operator [P] based on ω-proofs.
Formalized deduction
For our purposes, a theory is a set of sequents defined by an arithmetical formula T γ, where γ is a first-order variable. For ρ ≤ ω, fix Rule ρ (x, y) ∈ ∆ 0 0 such that it is provable in ECA 0 that if Rule ρ (x, y) holds, then x codes a sequence of sequents δ i i<n and y codes a sequent γ, and such that δ i i<n γ is an instance of a rule of Tait ρ if and only if Rule ρ ( δ i i<n , γ) holds. We also need to formalize the infinitary Tait calculus with the ω-rule, which we denote by ω-Tait. Recall that this rule has infinitely many premises, and has the following form:
We can formalize this using the following expression:
Here, P is a set-variable. The formula ω-Rule(P, γ) states that γ follows by applying one ω-rule to elements of P , and will be used in our formalizations of ω-logic.
Theories with oracles
In order to deal with free second-order variables, we will enrich theories with oracles. As we have mentioned previously, we will use countably many constants O = O i i∈N in order to 'feed' information about any tuple of sets of numbers into T . The O i 's are assumed to be disjoint from the second-order variables.
To be precise, we first encode finite sequences of sets in a natural way: for example, we may enconde A i i<n by
The pair 0, n is included in order to know the length of the sequence, in case that e.g. A n−1 = ∅. As with tuples of natural numbers, let us write n = |A|.
Then, given a Tait theory T and a set-tuple A, define T |A to be the theory whose rules and axioms are those of T together with the new rules
It should be clear that these rules can be defined by some arithmetical formula OrAx(y, A) and we define Rule T |A (x, y) = Rule(x, y) ∨ OrAx T (x, A). If T is a Tait theory, we will say T |A is a Tait theory with oracles. When working in T |A 1 , . . . , A n we may write x ∈Ā i instead of x ∈ O i to increase legibility; for example, instead of T |A,B φ(O 0 , O 1 ), we may write T |A,B φ(Ā,B).
Formalizing ω-logic using proof trees
In [1, 9] , derivability in ω-logic is formalized by the existence of an (infinite) derivation tree. It will be convenient to use a standardized representation of such trees. Let N <ω denote the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers. We will represent ω-trees as subsets of N <ω . If s, t ∈ N <ω , define s t if s is an initial segment of t, and ↓ s = {t ∈ S : t s}. Then, say that an ω-tree is a set S ⊆ N <ω such that ↓ S = S. A labeled ω-tree is a pair S, L such that S is an ω-tree and L : S → N. Definition 3.1. A preproof (for T ) of cut-rank at most ρ ≤ ω is a labeled ω-tree S, L such that for every s ∈ S, L(s) is a sequent, and there is an
If S is (upwards) well-founded, we will say that S, L is an ω-proof.
The formula PreProof ρ T (S, L) would make use of the formulas Rule and (a mild variant of) ω-Rule defined in §3.1; this is developed in much more detail, for example, in [9] .
The following is immediate from the definition:
The notion of provability [P] gives rise to a natural reflection scheme. Definition 3.4. Given a theory T , ρ ≤ ω, and a set of formulas Γ, we define a schema
where φ(z, X) ∈ Γ with all free variables shown.
We may omit the parameter ρ when ρ = ω, as well as the parameter T when T is just the Tait calculus. This form of reflection gives an alternative axiomatization for bar induction, as shown by Arai [1] .
Note the analogy with Kreisel and Lévy's result; just as reflection is equivalent to induction, ω-reflection is equivalent to transfinite induction. As we will see, different formulations of ω-logic can also give rise to certain forms of comprehension.
Countable ω-models and reflection
Another notion of reflection can be defined using ω-models. An ω-model is a second-order model whose first-order part consists of the standard natural numbers with the usual arithmetical operations. Because this part of our model is fixed, we only need to specify the second-order part, which consists of a family of sets over which we interpret second-order quantifiers. Moreover, if this family is countable, we can represent it using a single set.
In order to have names for all the sets appearing in our ω-model, we introduce countably many set-constants C = C i i<ω and let Π 1 ω (C) be the second-order language enriched with these constants. With this, a satisfaction notion can be associated to each countable coded ω-model in a natural way. If M codes a sequence of sets, a satisfaction class on M is a set which obeys the usual recursive clauses of Tarski's truth definition, where each constant C n is interpreted as M n . Let us give a precise definition:
such that, for any terms t, s, n ∈ N, and sentences φ, ψ,
(∃u φ(u)) ∈ S ⇒ for some n ∈ N, φ(n) ∈ S; (∀u φ(u)) ∈ S ⇒ for all n ∈ N, φ(n) ∈ S; (∃X φ(X)) ∈ S ⇒ for some n ∈ N, φ(C n ) ∈ S; (∀X φ(X)) ∈ S ⇒ for all n ∈ N, φ(C n ) ∈ S.
Given a set of sentences Γ ⊆ Π 1 ω (C) closed under subformulas and substitution by closed terms (including set-constants), if for every φ ∈ Γ we have that either φ ∈ S or ∼φ ∈ S, we will say that S is a Γ-satisfaction class
Since the first-order part of an ω-model is just the natural numbers, it is easy to see that, for arithmetical sentences, truth in a model is equivalent to truth. This partially extends to Π 
Proof. First assume that φ is arithmetical, and let M be a model of T of rank ρ. Then, an external induction using the definition of a satisfaction class shows that, if φ holds, then M |= φ. Otherwise, assume that φ = ∀X ψ(X) and M |= ∀Xψ(X), so that M |= ψ(C k ) for some k. But then, by the arithmetical case, ψ(C k ) fails, so that ∀X ψ(X) fails.
The following claim is immediate from observing that every model of rank σ is already a model of any rank ρ ≤ σ: Lemma 4.4. Let φ be an arbitrary formula and ρ ≤ σ ≤ ω. Then,
We may use ω-models to define a notion of reflection ω M -RFN Theorem 4.5. Let 0 < n ≤ ω, and fix a finite axiomatization of ACA 0 of rank ρ. Then,
In fact, [P]γ and [M]γ are equivalent [9] . In the next section we will use inductive definitions to define two further notions of provability, which are also equivalent over a strong enough base theory. [11] .
Inductive definitions of ω-logic
We may also formalize 'provable in ω-logic' in second-order arithmetic using a least fixed point construction. To this end, let us review how such fixed points may be treated in this framework.
Inductive definitions
Let us quickly review inductive definitions in the context of second-order arithmetic. Below, recall that we are working in a language without negation for non-atomic formulas.
Definition 5.1. Let φ be any formula and X a set-variable. We say φ is positive on X if φ contains no occurrences of t ∈ X.
A positive formula φ induces a map F = F φ : 2 N → 2 N , which is monotone in the sense that X ⊆ Y implies that F (X) ⊆ F (Y ). It is well-known that any such operator has a least fixed point.
Definition 5.2. Given a formula φ(n, X), we define the abbreviations
It is readily checked that n ∈ µX.φ if and only if φ(n, µX.φ) holds. Such fixed points can be constructed 'from below' using transfinite iterations of F : if we define F 0 (X) = X, F ξ+1 (X) = F (F ξ (X)) and F ξ (X) = ζ<ξ F ζ (X), then by cardinality considerations one can see that
On the other hand, we may define µX.φ 'from above' as the intersection of all sets Y such that Closed(Y ) holds. The latter definition is available in Π 1 1 -CA 0 , as is well-known (see e.g. [5] ), and thus we see that:
In particular, the rules of ω-logic give rise to a positive operator, and a theorem of ω-logic is any element of its least fixed point. Below, we develop this idea to give alternative formalizations of ω-logic.
The iterative formalization of ω-logic
We may use (6) to formalize 'φ is a theorem of ω-logic', as in [6, 7] . There, provability along a countable well-order Λ is modeled using an 'iterated provability class' P , defined by arithmetical transfinite recursion as follows:
Definition 5.4. Let Λ be a second-order variable that will be used to denote a well-order and T be a formal theory. Define Iter T (φ, P ) to be the formula Recall that, by our convention, the parameter ρ will be omitted when ρ = ω. This form of reflection gives rise to an axiomatization of ATR 0 [6]:
Theorem 5.5. Let U, T be c.e. theories such that ECA 0 ⊆ U ⊆ ATR 0 , ECA 0 ⊆ T and such that ATR 0 proves that any set X can be included in a full ω-model for T . Let Γ be any set of formulas such that
In Theorem 6.6, we will extend this result to reflection over higher complexity classes, and show that it also gives rise to an axiomatization of bar induction.
Formalizing ω-logic via a least fixed point
We obtain strictly more powerful reflection principles if we model ω-logic by an inductively defined fixed point, rather than its transfinite approximations.
Definition 5.6. Fix a theory T , possibly with oracles, and ρ ≤ ω. Then, define a formula
If SPC ρ T (Q) holds we will say that Q is a saturated provability class of rank ρ (ρ-SPC) for T .
With this, we may define our fixed point provability operator. Definition 5.7. We define a formula
We will often want to apply this operator to formulas rather than sequents; when this is the case, we will identify a formula φ with the singleton sequent φ , and write [I|X] 
that is, the two theories prove the same Π 0 1 sentences. This is proven in [7] for a weaker notion of provability, but the argument carries through in our setting. Roughly, we observe that
, since in this case an SPC would simply consist of the set of all formulas.
Unlike the existence of SPCs, their uniqueness is immediate from their definition.
Lemma 5.11. If T is any theory and ρ ≤ ω, we have that
where ∃ ≤1 P φ(P ) is an abbreviation of ∀P ∀Q φ(P ) ∧ φ(Q) → P = Q .
As one might expect, adding new sets to our oracle gives us a stronger theory:
Lemma 5.12. Let T be any theory and ρ ≤ ω. It is provable in ECA 0 that if A is a tuple of sets and there exists an SPC for T |A, then for any sequent γ and any set B,
[I|A]
Using our assumption, we may choose an SPC P for T |A, so that γ ∈ P . Let Q be an arbitrary SPC for T |A, B. Observe that Q contains all axioms of T |A and is closed under all of its rules, so that by the minimality of P , we have that P ⊆ Q and thus γ ∈ Q. Since Q was arbitrary, it follows that [I|A, B] ρ T γ, as needed.
Obseve also that our least-fixed-point formalization of ω-provability is at least as strong as the formalization using ω-proofs: Lemma 5.13. Given any formula φ and ρ ≤ σ ≤ ω, it is provable in ACA 0
ρ T γ holds, and let S, L be an ω-proof of γ. Now, consider any SPC P , and consider the set S ′ = {s ∈ S : L(s) ∈ P }, which is available in ACA 0 . By the closure conditions of P , one readily checks that S ′ cannot have a minimal element, and thus must be empty. In particular, γ = L( ) ∈ P .
Our goal now is to prove impredicative reflection within Π Lemma 5.14 (ω-model soundness). Given any theory T , a-tuple A, and ρ ≤ ω,
Proof sketch. For the first claim, reason in ACA 0 . Let M be any model of T of rank ρ and let P be a saturated provability class for T |A of rank ρ. Let S ′ be obtained from S M by replacing each C i with by O i if i < a and by V a+i otherwise. Then, S ′ is closed under all the rules and axioms defining P , so that, by minimality, P ⊆ S ′ . It follows that if φ(O <a ) ∈ P , then φ(O <a ) ∈ P and so φ(C <a ) ∈ S M ; that is, M |= φ(C <a ).
The second claim then follows from the first, together with the provable existence of a unique ρ-SPC in Π 1 1 -CA 0 . We remark that Lemma 5.14.1 may be formalized in a weaker theory, say RCA 0 . However, this will not be relevant for our main results.
Completeness and strong predicative reflection
In this section we will recall some completeness results for formalized ω-logic. It is well-known that ω-logic is Π 1 1 -complete [15] , but it will be convenient to keep track of the second-order axioms needed to prove this. From these results, we will obtain a more general form of Theorem 5.5.
Completeness results for ω-logic
We begin with a weak completeness result available in ECA 0 .
Lemma 6.1. Fix a theory T and ρ ≤ ω. Let γ(z, X) ⊆ Π 0 ω with all free variables shown. Then, it is provable in ECA 0 that
Proof. Reasoning within ECA 0 , fix a tuple n of natural numbers and A of sets and assume that γ(n, A) holds, and write γ = (δ, φ) so that φ ∈ γ holds. We proceed by an external induciton on φ. Assume that P is an arbitrary SPC for T |X; we must prove that δ, φ(n, O) ∈ P . If φ does not contain quantifiers we proceed as in a standard Σ 0 1 -completeness proof, as in e.g. [10, pp. 175-176]; we omit the details, but remark that the case for atomic formulas requires a secondary external induction on the complexity of the terms that may appear. Now assume that φ contains quantifiers. Let us consider the case where φ = ∀x θ. By the external induction hypothesis we have, for every k, that
But, P is closed under the ω-rule, so we also have that δ, ∀x θ(x,n, O) ∈ P.
The remaining cases follow a similar structure; the case where φ is a Boolean combination of its subformulas is straightforward using the rules of the Tait calculus, and if φ = ∃x θ(x), then for some k we have that θ(k) is true and we may use the induction hypothesis plus existential introduction.
So, ECA 0 already proves the completeness of ω-logic for arithmetical formulas, but we need to turn to ACA 0 to prove that it is also complete for Π 
The following is then immediate from Lemma 5.13: Corollary 6.3. For any formula φ(X) ∈ Π 1 ω and any ρ ≤ ω,
For formulas of relatively low complexity, we can replace [M|A] ρ T φ by φ: Corollary 6.4. Let ρ ≤ ω.
1. Given φ(z, X) ∈ Π 1 1 with all free variables shown,
2 with all free variables shown, 
Predicative reflection and bar induction
Using the results we have discussed on completeness of ω-logic and Theorem 4.5, we may extend Theorem 5.5 to consider reflection for higher complexity classes. Below, recall that the parameter ρ may be omitted when ρ = ω. Lemma 6.5. Let T be any theory. Then, over ATR 0 , the following are provably equivalent:
Proof. That 3 implies 2 is proven in [6] , and that 2 implies 1 follows from Theorem 6.2. Thus it remains to show that 1 implies 3.
Reasoning in ATR 0 , suppose that S, L is an ω-proof of φ. We use a well-known technique of 'linearizing' , as in e.g. [1] . Consider the ordering on S given by s t if one of the following occurs: (a) t s, or (b) s, t are incomparable under , and for the least i such that s i = t i , we have that (s) i ≤ (t) i . Then, it is readily verified that is a well-order on S. Using arithmetical transfinite recursion, let P be an IPC for T |A along S, .
Then, a straightforward transfinite induction along shows that, for all s ∈ S, L(s) ∈ P s ; in particular, φ ∈ P . Since P was arbitrary, we conclude that [R|A] T φ. Theorem 6.6. Let U be a theory such that ECA 0 ⊆ U ⊆ ATR 0 . Then, for any n ≤ ω,
Proof. The case for n = 0 follows from Theorem 5.5, in view of the fact that
. Let ρ be the rank of an axiomatization of ACA 0 . Note that by Theorem 5.5, ATR 0 ⊆ R, and hence
where the second equivalence is due to the fact that ATR 0 proves that any satisfaction class extends to a full satisfaction class. But, by Theorem 4.5,
In view of Lemma 2.2, it follows that Theorem 5.5 is sharp:
Remark 6.8. We could instead use Theorem 3.5 to obtain a variant of Theorem 6.6 with the pure Tait calculus in place of ACA 0 . For greater generality, it may be of interest to analyze the proof in [11] to identify the minimal requirements on a theory T which would allow us to replace ACA 0 by T .
Consistency and reflection using inductive definitions
In this section we will define the notions of reflection and consistency that naturally correspond to [I|A] ρ T . Moreover, we will link the two notions to each other and see how they relate to comprehension. Below, recall that ⊥ denotes the empty sequent. Definition 7.1. Given a theory T , ρ ≤ ω, and a class of formulas Γ, we define the schemas
for φ(z, X) ∈ Γ with all free variables shown.
Lemma 7.2. Given any theory T , 
Proof. Reasoning by contrapositive, if ω I -CONS
fails, then for some formula φ(z, X), some tuple of sets A and some tuple of natural numbers n, we have that Let us now see that with just a little amount of reflection we get arithmetical comprehension. The fist step is to build new sets out of our provability operators.
Lemma 7.4. Let T be any Tait theory, φ(z, X) be any formula and ρ ≤ ω. Then, ρ T φ(n, O) holds, then in particular φ(n, O) ∈ P holds and n ∈ W by definition, so W has all desired properties.
Since A was arbitrary, the claim follows.
Lemma 7.5. Let T be any theory and ρ ≤ ω. Then,
. We only need to prove Σ 0 1 -CA, that is,
where φ(n, X) can be any formula in Σ 0 1 (X). Fix some tuple of sets A. By Lemma 7.4, we can form the set
We claim that ∀n n ∈ Z ↔ φ(n, A) which finishes the proof. If n ∈ Z, then, by reflection, φ(n, A). On the other hand, if φ(n, A) we get by arithmetical completeness (Lemma 6.1) that [I|A] ρ T φ(n, O), so that n ∈ Z.
The above result along with the completeness theorems mentioned earlier may be used to prove that many theories defined using reflection and consistency are equivalent. Below, ∼Γ = {∼φ : φ ∈ Γ}. Lemma 7.6. Let T be a theory extending Q + , and ρ ≤ ω. Then:
Proof. For the first claim, let us begin by proving that
Assume ω I -RFN ρ Γ∪∼Γ [T ] and let φ ∈ Γ. Towards a contradiction, suppose that for some tuple of natural numbers n and some tuple of sets A,
By reflection, this gives us φ(n, A) ∧ ∼φ(n, A), which is impossible. Since φ was arbitrary, the claim follows.
Next we prove that
For this, fix φ ∈ Γ ∪ ∼Γ and reason in ECA 0 + ω I -CONS Before considering the case where φ is not arithmetical, observe that since Σ 0 1 ⊆ Γ, it follows that
and by Lemma 7.5, we have that
so we may now use arithmetical comprehension.
With this observation in mind, the argument will be very similar to the one before. Once again, suppose that [I|A] Thus impredicative reflection implies impredicative comprehension, as claimed. Next we will prove the opposite implication, but for this we will first need to take a detour through β-models.
Countable β-models and impredicative reflection
Our goal in this section is to derive a converse of Theorem 7.8. The main tool for this task will be the notion of a countable coded β-model. In what follows we shall discuss the definition and basic existence results for such models.
Note that the converse of Lemma 4.3 is not always true for Π 1 1 -sentences, as we are not truly quantifying over all subsets of N. Nevertheless, for special kinds of models it may actually be the case that M |= ∀Xφ(X) implies that ∀Xφ(X) when φ is arithmetical; such models are called β-models.
Below, recall that V = V i i∈N is assumed to be a sequence listing all second-order variables, and that S <a = S i i<a for any sequence S.
1 and every n, φ(n, |M| <a ) holds if and only if M |= φ(n, C <a ). Thus, β-models reflect Π 1 1 formulas; however, with no additional assumptions, we can push this property a bit farther.
. It is provable in ACA 0 that, for all a-tuples A and all n, if M is a β-model with |M| <a = A and such that M |= φ(n, C <a ), then φ(n, A) holds.
Proof. Write φ = ∃X ∀Y ψ(z, V <a , X, Y ) and suppose that A is an a-tuple of sets and M a model with |M| <a = A. Then, if M |= φ(C <a ), it follows that for some m, M |= ∀Z ψ (C <a , C m , Y ). But since by assumption M is a β-model, it follows that ∀Z ψ(A, |M| m , Z) holds, hence so does φ = ∃X ∀Y ψ(A, X, Y ).
A good part of the theory of β-models may be formalized within Π 1 1 -CA 0 . Theorems 8.3 and 8.4 may be found in [17] . Recall that we defined the theories ATR 0 and Π With these results in mind, we can now easily prove that comprehension implies reflection.
Lemma 8.5. Let U, T be theories such that U extends ACA 0 and ρ ≤ ω. If U proves that any a-tuple A can be included in an ω-model satisfying T of rank ρ, then for any φ(z, X) ∈ Π 1 2 with all free variables shown, U proves that
If U proves that any a-tuple A can be included in a β-model satisfying T of rank ρ ≤ ω, (9) holds for φ ∈ Π 1 3 . Proof. For the first claim, let φ(z, V <a ) = ∀X ψ(z, V <a , X), where ψ ∈ Σ 1 1 with all free variables shown, and reason in ACA 0 . Fix an a-tuple A of sets, a tuple of natural numbers n, and a ρ-SPC P , and assume that φ(n, O <a ) ∈ P . Let B be arbitrary and M be an ω-model satisfying T with |M| <a+1 = A, B. Then, by Lemma 5.14.1, M |= ψ(n, C <a , C a ), so that by Lemma 8.2, ψ(n, A, B) holds. Since B was arbitrary, we conclude that φ(n, A) = ∀Xψ(n, A, X) holds. The second claim is similar, but we take ψ ∈ Σ 
We may now summarize our results in our main theorem. Theorem 8.7. Let U, T be theories such that ECA 0 ⊆ U ⊆ Π In view of Theorem 4.5, we may extend these results to reflection over higher complexity classes.
Theorem 8.9. Let U be a theory such that ECA 0 ⊆ U ⊆ Π 1 1 -CA 0 , and let ρ be the rank of some finite axiomatization of ACA 0 . Then, for any n < ω and σ ∈ [ρ, ω],
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.6, the case for n = 0 is immediate from Theorem 8.7, so we assume n > 0. Let B = Π Thus it is tempting to conjecture that either (1) or (2) is sufficient to obtain Π 
Concluding remarks
We have shown that Π 1 1 -CA 0 and its extensions with bar induction are equivalent, over a weak base theory, to a family of proof-theoretic reflection or consistency assertions formalized using least fixed points. This, together with work on reflection principles based on ω-proofs and iterated approximations to a least fixed point, shows that many important systems of reverse mathematics may be represented in terms of reflection principles for ω-logic.
This immediately raises the question of whether stronger theories may be represented in a similar fashion, as well as theories in the language of (say) set theory. Such an endeavour would most likely require working with infinitary rules much stronger than the ω-rule, and may be a fuitful line of future inquiry.
A second natural question is whether these results will lead to a Π 0 1 ordinal analysis of these theories, in the style of Beklemishev's analysis of PA [3] . While this goal is part of the motivation for the present work, it is clear that this would require many further advances, both in the proof theory of reflection principles and in the study of transfinite provability logic.
